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The National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") requires that
employers bargain collectively with the authorized representa-
tives of their employees.' The statute mandates bargaining over
"wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment,"
and, more problematically, requires that the parties bargain in
"good faith."2 While agreeing on broad principles, the courts and
the National Labor Relations Board ("the Board") have struggled
to identify what "good faith" requires in individual cases. For
decades, courts have disagreed about whether an employer acts
in bad faith when it refuses to back up its claim that paying a
particular wage would place it at a "competitive disadvantage."3
At the heart of this disagreement lies an employer's reluctance to
disclose financial information to the union.4
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1 Pub L No 74-198, 49 Stat 499 (1935), codified as amended at 29 USC §§ 151-69
(1988). Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer... to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees."
29 USC § 158(a)(5).
2 Section 8(d) of the NLRA defines collective bargaining as:
the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of
the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment ... but such obligation
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a conces-
sion.
29 USC § 158(d).
* Compare NLRB v Western Wirebound Box Co., 356 F2d 88 (9th Cir 1966); K-Mart
Corp. v NLRB, 626 F2d 704 (9th Cir 1980) (competitive disadvantage claims must be
substantiated), with United Fire Proof Warehouse v NLRB, 356 F2d 494 (7th Cir 1966);
NLRB v Harvstone Manufacturing Corp., 785 F2d 570 (7th Cir 1986); Nielsen Lithograph-
ing Co. v NLRB, 854 F2d 1063 (7th Cir 1988) ("Nielsen 1"); Graphic Communications
Local 508 (Nielsen Lithographing) v NLRB, 977 F2d 1168 (7th Cir 1992) ("Nielsen 11") (no
duty to substantiate competitive disadvantage claims).
" In this Comment, "financial information" includes information used by manage-
ment to predict future economic performance. Examples include:
an employer's assessment of the company's health, detailed production and sales
data, information about products and inventory, techniques and processes used by
the employer, long-range forecasts of growth or contraction, and detailed breakdowns
of the employer's financial posture (expanding the financial reports ordinarily avail-
able to shareholders).
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The Board and the courts have long held that employers act
in bad faith when they refuse to give unions "relevant informa-
tion needed by a labor union for the proper performance of its
duties."5 And in NLRB v Truitt Manufacturing Co., the Court
held that financial information could be relevant and necessary if
management claimed it was unable to pay a particular wage.6 In
other words, unsubstantiated "inability-to-pay" claims can in
themselves constitute bad faith.7 Whether an employer's compet-
itive disadvantage claims should be treated in the same way is a
separate question, though Truitt can be read to suggest as
much.'
The Board, however, presently treats inability-to-pay and
competitive disadvantage claims as "analytically distinct," requir-
ing substantiation in the former case, but not the latter Inabili-
ty-to-pay claims can range from relatively subtle statements such
as "the Company 'couldn't reach' the Union's wage proposal,""
to transparent pleas of poverty." Competitive disadvantage
Note, Substantiating "Competitive Disadvantage" Claims: A Broad Reading of Truitt, 87
Mich L Rev 2026, 2028 n 14 (1989), citing Leslie K. Shedlin, Regulation of Disclosure of
Economic and Financial Data and the Impact on the American System of Labor-Manage-
ment Relations, 41 Ohio St L J 441, 445-46 (1980). Although wage rates enter into any
such calculation, the union has the right to such information because of the impracticabil-
ity of asking each member what his or her wages are and compiling this information inde-
pendently. See note 30 and accompanying text.
' Detroit Edison Co. v NLRB, 440 US 301, 303-04 (1979); NLRB v Acme Industrial
Co., 385 US 432, 435-36 (1967).
6 351 US 149, 152-53 (1956).
7 Id at 153.
a See id at 153-54.
See United Steelworkers Local 14534 v NLRB, 983 F2d 240, 244 (DC Cir 1993)
("Local 14534"). For nearly twenty-five years the Board treated competitive disadvantage
and inability to pay claims similarly. See, for example, Nielsen Lithographing Co., 279
NLRB 877 (1986). In 1988, the Seventh Circuit remanded Nielsen to the Board to recon-
sider its position on competitive disadvantage claims. Nielsen I, 854 F2d at 1065. On
remand, the Board reversed its position, and adopted the Seventh Circuit's. Nielsen
Lithographing Co., 305 NLRB 679 (1991), aff'd, Nielsen II, 977 F2d at 1168.
Although beyond the scope of this Comment, the Board's reversal raises interesting
administrative law issues. The Second, Seventh, and D.C Circuits have deferred to the
new standard, although it is based on the Board's interpretation of Truitt, rather than the
NLRA. See Nielsen, 305 NLRB at 699-700. The Second Circuit recently stated:
Recently, however, the Board has altered its reading of Truitt .... Although the
[Nielsen] opinion may not be as reasoned as we might wish and is a reading of Truitt
we do not entirely share, we must "uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the
agency's path may reasonably be discerned."
Torrington Extend-A-Care Employee Ass'n v NLRB, 1994 US App LEXIS 3646 at *19-23
(2d Cir Feb 28, 1994), quoting Motor Vehicles Manufacturers Ass'n v State Farm Mutual
Insurance Co., 463 US 29, 43 (1983) (emphasis added).
" New York Printing Pressman & Offset Workers Union No. 51 v NLRB, 538 F2d 496,
500 (2d Cir 1976).
" See, for example, Drivers, Warehouse & Dairy Employees Local 75 v NLRB, 866
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claims, by contrast, link wage positions with financial status
without asserting that the employer is literally unable to pay the
wage. Thus, it might be difficult, rather than impossible, to pay a
proposed wage. Examples include claiming a "cut was necessary
because of price cutting indulged in by competition"12 and
"seeking [ ] concessions to increase [ ] competitive standing.""3
Employers have fought to maintain this distinction through a
narrow interpretation of Truitt, fearing that disclosure of finan-
cial information outside of inability-to-pay cases would both
threaten confidentiality and encourage unions to second-guess
management decisions. Under this view, referred to here as the
Harvstone/Nielsen doctrine, employers need only back up inabili-
ty-to-pay claims and not competitive disadvantage claims.'4 In
contrast, unions, fearing that they will be unable to bargain
effectively and responsibly if they must guess whether manage-
ment is lying, have pushed for a broad interpretation of Truitt.
Under this approach, referred to here as the Western Wirebound
doctrine, employers must provide the union with information
sufficient to verify the accuracy of any competitive disadvantage
claim. 5
Both the narrow and broad interpretations of Truitt purport
to advance the underlying policies of the NLRA. The
Harvstone/Nielsen doctrine protects management autonomy, 6
while the Western Wirebound doctrine seeks to improve labor-
management cooperation and the bargaining process.'7 But both
F2d 1537 (table), 1989 US App LEXIS 1129 *5-6 (DC Cir 1989) ("Local 75"); NLRB v
Unoco Apparel, Inc., 508 F2d 1368, 1370 (5th Cir 1975) ("[The] employees came to the
wrong well ... the well is dry."); United Steelworkers Local 5571 v NLRB, 401 F2d 434,
436 (DC Cir 1968) ("When the final wage offers were exchanged, the Company returned to
its claim that the money to pay for the Union's proposal just wasn't there."). "Although no
magic words are required to express an inability to pay, the words and conduct must be
specific enough to convey such a meaning."ACL Corp., 271 NLRB 1600, 1602 (1984).
12 Western Wirebound, 356 F2d at 89.
, United Paperworkers Int'l Union v NLRB, 981 F2d 861, 866 (6th Cir 1992). Other
examples are stating that "concessions were needed in order to 'be competitive' and
'survive in today's market, Local 14534, 983 F2d at 244; making "assertions pertain[ing]
only to declining market conditions attributable to competition from other businesses," id;
giving "general evaluations of [ I] long-term financial viability," Local 75, 1989 US App
LEXIS 1129 at *6; and supporting a position "on the ground that [the employer] was
paying rates in excess of prevailing rates of its competition in the same labor market."
Dallas General Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local 745 v NLRB, 355 F2d 842, 845
(DC Cir 1966).
1' See Harvstone, 785 F2d at 577; Nielsen I, 854 F2d at 1065-66; Nielsen II, 977 F2d
at 1170-71.
,5 See Western Wirebound, 356 F2d at 91.
" Nielsen II, 977 F2d at 1171.
, Western Wirebound, 356 F2d at 91. See also First National Maintenance Corp. v
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interpretations push labor-management relations toward ex-
tremes. The Harvstone/Nielsen rule allows management to lie
with impunity, while the Western Wirebound rule allows unions
to second-guess employer decisions and exact unwarranted con-
cessions.
This Comment proposes a third alternative-a "controlled
disclosure" rule. Under this rule, management would have to
disclose financial information if the Board found substantial
evidence that management either lied during bargaining or came
to the table unwilling to agree. 8 This intermediate rule favors
neither management nor labor, but seeks to ensure that the
process is fair. It requires disclosure in precisely those cases in
which management is likely to misuse information, but limits the
scope of disclosure and the union's use of the information. Fur-
thermore, because the controlled disclosure standard requires a
case-by-case approach, it minimizes the risks of both manage-
ment and labor abuse-risks invited by the per se approaches of
Harvstone/Nielsen and Western Wirebound.
I. GOOD FAITH AND THE DUTY TO FURNISH INFORMATION
To determine whether an employer's competitive disadvan-
tage claim is accurate, the union needs access to the employer's
financial information. However, the employer's duty to provide
this information depends upon whether failing to do so amounts
to acting in bad faith. The debate over financial disclosure rules
is thus part of the larger debate over good faith generally.
A. The Requirement of Good Faith
In labor-management relations, the Board and the courts
define not only the subjects about which the parties must bargain
(terms and conditions of employment), but also how they must
bargain (in good faith). Although the meaning of good faith "is
not readily ascertainable,"' 9 two general statements can be
NLRB, 452 US 666, 678-79 (1981) (stating the NLRA was intended to promote the mutu-
ally beneficial resolution of conflicts while preserving management autonomy "to the
extent essential for the running of a profitable business").
"8 Under this approach, management would have no duty to substantiate even an
inability-to-pay claim made in good faith. Both the Harvstone/Nielsen and the Western
Wirebound approaches require management to substantiate all inability-to-pay claims
regardless of whether the claims were made in good faith. See Teleprompter Corp. v
NLRB, 570 F2d 4, 9 n 2 (lst Cir 1977) (citing cases).
19 Charles J. Morris, ed, 1 The Developing Labor Law 553 (ABA, 2d ed 1983).
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made. First, good faith "is inconsistent with a predetermined
resolve not to budge from an initial position."" Second, good
faith "necessarily requires that claims made by either bargainer
should be honest claims."2'
Good faith in collective bargaining therefore requires that
the parties come to the table willing to agree, and that they do
not make false claims. However, it does not require that the
parties in fact agree, and it does not restrict their ability to pos-
ture, change their positions, or be stubborn. The NLRA itself
provides that the obligation to bargain collectively "does not com-
pel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a
concession."22 To find good or bad faith the Board must examine
all of the facts and draw the fine lines separating "puffing" and
stubbornness from lying and a predisposition not to agree.
Although the plain language of the NLRA suggests a case-by-
case inquiry into good faith in every bargaining dispute, such an
approach is not always necessary.' Instead, the Board often
employs per se rules, holding that certain actions violate the duty
of good faith regardless of their actual purpose. For instance,
management would act in bad faith if it refused to bargain with
the union for one year after certification, even if it believed in
good faith that the union no longer enjoyed majority support.
The dispute over competitive disadvantage claims is essentially
about whether a per se rule-either in favor of or against disclo-
sure-or the case-by-case approach is more appropriate.
B. The Duty to Disclose Relevant Information
Shortly after Congress passed the NLRA in 1935, the Board
held, as a corollary to the general duty of good faith, that man-
20 Truitt, 351 US at 154 (Frankfurter concurring in part and dissenting in part);
NLRB v Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 US 477, 498 (1960) (stating the duty to bar-
gain collectively requires parties to approach bargaining with "real desire to come into
agreement").
21 Truitt, 351 US at 152.
29 USC § 158(d).
See id. Section 8(d) requires "the employer and the representative of the employees
to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment.. .. " As one commentator has noted, "Con-
gress did not give content to these words, leaving the Board and the courts to fill them
with meaning." Clyde W. Summers, Harry H. Wellington, and Alan Hyde, Cases and
Materials on Labor Law 712 (Foundation Press, 2d ed 1982). Although § 6 gives the Board
rulemaking authority, it has typically announced rules in individual cases. See American
Hospital Ass'n v NLRB, 499 US 606, 609-10 (1991).
2, See Brooks v NLRB, 348 US 96, 103 (1954), rule reaffirmed in NLRB v Curtin
Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 US 775, 777 (1990).
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agement had a duty to provide the union with relevant informa-
tion." This requirement implies three related propositions.
First, management has the right to keep irrelevant information
from the union. Second, the union has the right to inspect any
and all relevant information in management's possession. And
third, management's refusal to supply such information consti-
tutes a failure to bargain in good faith."
The Supreme Court has described relevant information as
that which is "needed by the bargaining representative for the
proper performance of its duties."27 However, the union can gen-
erally show "necessity" under a lenient standard similar to that
afforded civil litigants in discovery. In NLRB v Acme Industrial
Co., the Court held that the Board properly ordered disclosure of
information "acting upon the probability that the desired infor-
mation was relevant, and that it would be of use to the union in
carrying out its statutory duties and responsibilities."' Under
this standard, the union is entitled to information that would be
useful in developing its bargaining positions, and in evaluating
management's positions, even if the information is not strictly
necessary for bargaining to go forward.29
As with good-faith inquiries generally, the Board here em-
ploys per se rules, holding that certain information is so essential
that its relevance need not be reestablished in each case. Infor-
mation about wages paid to individual employees is a relatively
straightforward example." The union is entitled to such infor-
mation on demand without showing why it would be necessary.
See Pioneer Pearl Button Co., 1 NLRB 837, 842-43 (1936). See also NLRB v Acme
Industrial Co., 385 US 432, 435-36 (1967); Nielsen II, 977 F2d at 1170 (stating the union
is entitled to information "as a corollary of the statutorily protected right of collective bar-
gaining"), citing NLRB v Burkart Foam, Inc., 848 F2d 825, 833 (7th Cir 1988).
26 Truitt, 351 US at 152-53.
27 Acme Industrial, 385 US at 435-36.
28 Id at 437 (describing this as a "discovery-type standard").
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) provides:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant
to the subject matter involved in the pending action .... The information need not
be admissible at trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence.
FRCP 26(b)(1) (emphasis added).
"0 See Whitin Machine Works, 108 NLRB 1537, 1538-39 (1954), enfd, 217 F2d 593
(4th Cir 1954). See also NLRB v F.W. Woolworth Co., 352 US 938 (1956) (per curiam)
(Under the circumstances in this case, "failure to furnish the wage information constitut-
ed an unfair labor practice."). Another example is the number of hours each employee in
the bargaining unit has worked. Morris, The Developing Labor Law at 624-25 (cited in
note 19) ("Items of information related to hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment' have been ordered disclosed on the same basis as wage information.").
[61:675
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For other types of information, the union must show necessity in
a particular context. For example, the union is entitled to infor-
mation about time-study data when the piece rate for certain jobs
is at issue, but not as a matter of course."'
If management does not voluntarily comply with a union's
request for relevant information, the Board can require disclo-
sure." By asserting countervailing interests such as confidenti-
ality, employers sometimes successfully avoid disclosure-even
when the union has a legitmate interest in the information.33
However, the union's right to relevant information often out-
weighs such employer concerns. 4
H. FINANCIAL INFORMATION AND MANAGEMENT AUTONOMY
"Financial information" has historically received greater
protection from disclosure than have other types of informa-
tion.35 Accordingly, it has only been considered relevant in limit-
ed circumstances. Courts have not applied the usefulness stand-
ard used in other information-disclosure cases when reviewing
union demands for financial information.36 In fact, until Truitt,
the circuit courts had split on whether an employer ever had a
duty to disclose such information, despite its obvious usefulness
to the union." In Truitt, the Court held that an employer could
be required to disclose financial information to back up an inabil-
ity-to-pay claim.3
" See J.I. Case Co. v NLRB, 253 F2d 149, 154-55 (7th Cir 1958).
"The Board is empowered... to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair
labor practice affecting commerce." 29 USC § 160(a). See also Truitt, 351 US at 152;
Teleprompter Corp. v NLRB, 570 F2d 4, 10 (1st Cir 1977).
' See, for example, Detroit Edison Co. v NLRB, 440 US 301, 314-17 (1979) (holding
the employer's interest in protecting the identity of employment aptitude test takers
outweighed the union's right to relevant information).
See, for example, Curtiss-Wright Corp. v NLRB, 347 F2d 61, 71 (3d Cir 1965)
(holding relevance outweighed the employer's confidentiality concerns); Olivetti Office
U.S.A., Inc. v NLRB, 926 F2d 181, 188-89 (2d Cir 1991) (holding the employer's confiden-
tiality interest did not outweigh the union's right to relevant information where the union
assured the company that all disclosed data would remain confidential).
See note 4 for the definition of financial information.
See Teleprompter, 570 F2d at 11 (holding that the "discovery" rule is not tailored to
inability-to-pay cases and that the union is entitled only to that information reasonably
necessary to substantiate the employer's claim).
" Compare NLRB v Truitt Manufacturing Co., 224 F2d 869, 874 (4th Cir 1955) (no
duty to disclose financial information), rev'd, 351 US 149 (1956), with NLRB v Jacobs
Manufacturing Co., 196 F2d 680, 684 (2d Cir 1952) (financial information must be dis-
closed to substantiate certain employer claims).
351 US at 152-53. However, the Court did not apply a per se rule to inability-to-
pay claims. See text accompanying note 55.
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The dispute over competitive disadvantage claims persists
because the scope of the so-called Truitt duty remains unclear.
The Court has neither specified which types of claims must be
substantiated nor identified particular circumstances in which
substantiation is required. However, courts generally agree that
financial information becomes relevant only when employers base
certain claims on such information.39 That the information may
be useful for developing union negotiation positions in a general
sense does not make it relevant. Instead, financial information is
relevant only if it enables the union to verify the employer's
claim.40
To set a standard for when employers must back up competi-
tive disadvantage claims, courts must not only resolve the scope
of employers' Truitt duties, but must also determine whether
these duties conflict with those the Supreme Court articulated in
First National Maintenance Corp. v NLRB.4 The First National
Maintenance Court held that "management decisions" are gener-
ally not mandatory subjects for bargaining.42 Recently, the Sev-
enth Circuit cited First National Maintenance to support the
Harvstone/Nielsen rule that competitive disadvantage claims
need not be substantiated.4" Other courts-ignoring the possible
importance of First National Maintenance-have held that Truitt
does extend to competitive disadvantage claims."
A. NLRB v Truitt
In Truitt, the Supreme Court upheld the Board's determina-
tion that an employer's failure to disclose financial information
supporting its inability-to-pay claim constituted a failure to bar-
See Teleprompter, 570 F2d at 11 & n 3. Although the Court endorsed the discovery
standard several years after Truitt in Acme Industrial, 385 US at 437, see text accompa-
nying notes 27-29, it did not purport to expand Truitt's narrower duty to substantiate
financial information. But see Summers, et al, Labor Law at 685 (cited in note 23),
implying that the Acme Industrial discovery standard should apply to financial informa-
tion. Under.this standard, the union's request, not the employer's claim, would trigger the
duty to disclose. Research reveals no court that has ever endorsed this reading of Acme
Industrial.
40 Robert A. Gorman, Basic Text on Labor Law, Unionization and Collective Bargain-
ing 413 (West, 1976) (stating an employer's assertion of poverty makes financial informa-
tion relevant). See also Truitt, 351 US at 152 (noting the Board could find that the failure
to substantiate a claim constituted a refusal to bargain in good faith).
41 452 US 666 (1981).
42 Id at 676-77.
See Nielsen II, 977 F2d at 1170-71.
See, for example, NLRB v Sioux City Stockyards, 901 F2d 669, 669-70 (8th Cir
1990) (per curiam).
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gain in good faith.45 During bargaining, the union asked for a
wage increase of 10 cents per hour, and the employer countered
that anything above 2.5 cents per hour would put it out of busi-
ness.' The union asked for some evidence to back up the
company's claim. When the employer refused this request, the
union asked for "full and complete information with respect to
[the company's] financial standing and profits."47 The company
refused to provide any substantiating information, telling the
union, "the information... is not pertinent to this discussion and
the company declines to give you such information; you have no
legal right to such."' The Board found that the employer's fail-
ure to back up its claim was an unfair labor practice under §
8(a)(5) and ordered the employer to supply the requested infor-
mation to the union.49
The Fourth Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's order,
holding that "[tihe information... relates to matters altogether
in the province of management, which were not the proper sub-
ject of bargaining."" In the Board's appeal to the Supreme
Court, the employer in Truitt argued first that "the information
requested was irrelevant to the bargaining process," and second
that the information "related to matters exclusively within the
province of management."5' The Court disagreed. In enforcing
the Board's order it stated:
Good-faith bargaining necessarily requires that claims made
by either bargainer should be honest claims. This is true
about an asserted inability to pay an increase in wages. If
such an argument is important enough to present in the give
and take of bargaining, it is important enough to require
some sort of proof of its accuracy.52
The Court noted that the Board's policy of requiring substan-
tiation in similar cases had started as early as one year after the
5 351 US at 149.
16 Id at 150.
47 Id.
4 Id at 150-51.
49 Id at 151.
50 Truitt, 224 F2d at 874. The Fourth Circuit thus implied that disclosure of this in-
formation would lead to bargaining about non-mandatory subjects. In another case, the
Second Circuit had enforced a similar order. Jacobs, 196 F2d at 682. The Jacobs court
held that an employer's refusal to back up its "bare assertion" of inability to pay violated
the duty of good faith. Id at 683.
51 351 US at 151.
52 Id at 152-53.
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passage of the NLRA in Pioneer Pearl Button Co.5" There, the
Board had held that an employer failed to bargain in good faith
when it "did no more than take refuge in the assertion that [its]
financial condition was poor."54 However, instead of adopting the
Board's implied presumption of bad faith from Pioneer Pearl
Button, the Truitt Court required a case-by-case determination.
The Court stated:
We do not hold, however, that in every case in which eco-
nomic inability is raised as an argument against increased
wages it automatically follows that the employees are enti-
tled to substantiating evidence. Each case must turn upon
its particular facts. The inquiry must always be whether or
not under the circumstances of the particular case the statu-
tory obligation to bargain in good faith has been met.55
The Court did not remand the case to the Board because, the
Court found, the Board had not actually employed a per se rule
that all inability-to-pay claims be supported. Instead the Board
had reached its conclusion that the employer failed to bargain in
good faith "under the facts and circumstances of this case."56
Justice Frankfurter and two others concurred in the decision
to reverse the Fourth Circuit, but dissented on the ground that
by failing to remand, the Court had in effect endorsed a per se
rule for inability-to-pay claims." Despite the Court's explicit
denial and Frankfurter's protest, courts endorsing both the
Harvstone/Nielsen and Western Wirebound doctrines have in fact
held that Truitt did endorse such a per se rule, at least for inabil-
ity-to-pay claims.58
The Court thus rejected the employer's claim that financial
information is irrelevant to bargaining. It is less clear, however,
Id at 153, citing Pioneer Pearl Button Co., 1 NLRB 837, 842-43 (1936).
Pioneer Pearl Button Co., 1 NLRB at 843.
Truitt, 351 US at 153-54.
6 Id at 153.
"' Id at 154-55 (Frankfurter concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that
a requirement of disclosure any time an employer refused to substantiate a claim of
inability to pay would "make a rule of law out of one item-even if a weighty item-of the
evidence").
' See, for example, Facet Enterprises, Inc. v NLRB, 907 F2d 963, 980 (10th Cir
1990); K-Mart Corp. v NLRB, 626 F2d 704, 707 (9th Cir 1980). For commentary reaching
a similar conclusion, see Archibald Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 Harv L
Rev 1401, 1430 (1958) (arguing that Truitt announced a per se rule); Comment, The
Encouragement of Labor-Management Cooperation: Improving American Productivity
Through Revision of the National Labor Relations Act, 40 UCLA L Rev 571, 624 n 242
(1992) (noting that Truitt has been applied as a per se rule).
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whether the Court disputed the Fourth Circuit's assertion that
some information is "exclusively within the province of manage-
ment." 9 The Court did not distinguish between information that
is itself within the exclusive province of management and infor-
mation that relates to matters that are within such a province.
However, it is quite reasonable to assume that information could
relate to matters within the exclusive province, but not be shield-
ed from disclosure if management used it to make false claims.
In any case, if there is such a province, after Truitt it does not
extend to the information necessary to verify potentially false
inability-to-pay claims.
B. First National Maintenance Co. v NLRB
First National Maintenance involved a more basic question:
whether an employer has any duty to bargain at all over certain
decisions. The Court held that the Board had exceeded its au-
thority by interpreting "terms and conditions of employ-
ment"--about which management must bargain-to include
management's decision to close part of a business.0 First Na-
tional Maintenance, a cleaning services company, decided not to
renew a service contract with one of its customers after the cus-
tomer insisted on a lower price.6' Although the employer
claimed it was closing that part of its business "purely [as] a
matter of money," complications arose because the employees
terminated as a result of the cancellation had recently voted to
unionize. 2 The union requested that the employer bargain
about its decision not to renew the contract, and when the em-
ployer refused, the union filed an unfair labor practice charge.'
The Board held that even if the employer had based its deci-
sion on purely financial considerations, it still had a duty to bar-
gain about the decision itself.' The Second Circuit affirmed but
Truitt, 351 US at 151.
60 452 US 666 (1980).
61 Id at 669-70.
6 Id. The NLRA prohibits employers from closing a part of a business because
employees have unionized. Textile Workers Union v Darlington Manufacturing Co., 380
US 263, 274-75 (1965). Even though a union is not entitled to bargain about a decision to
partially close a facility, the Board can require the employer to reinstate the affected
employees if the employer's decision was made with anti-union animus. First National
Maintenance, 452 US at 682. See also 29 USC § 160(c).
63 452 US at 669-70.
First National Maintenance Corp., 242 NLRB 462, 465 (1979). The Board endorsed
the Administrative Law Judge's determination that an employer with a unionized work
force who wishes to alter its hiring arrangements must discuss the decision with the
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stated that the Board's per se rule was inappropriate.65 Instead,
it held that the NLRA creates a rebuttable presumption in favor
of mandatory bargaining."
The Supreme Court reversed and announced its own test in
the process. The Court stated that "[m]anagement must be free
from the constraints of the bargaining process to the extent es-
sential for the running of a profitable business."7 Because of
these concerns about management autonomy, the Court held that
management decisions were presumptively not mandatory bar-
gaining subjects. Instead, it held that bargaining "over manage-
ment decisions that have a substantial impact on the continued
availability of employment should be required only if the benefit,
for labor-management relations and the collective bargaining pro-
cess, outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of the busi-
ness."' The Court premised this balancing test on the rationale
that subjects should be mandatory, rather than permissive, only
if mandatory bargaining fostered the neutral resolution of con-
fficts. 6
9
Applying its test, the Court found that requiring manage-
ment to bargain about "decision[s] ... akin to the decision
whether to be in business at all" imposed a substantial bur-
den. ° On the other hand, the potential benefit to the union was
slight. The Court stated that "[t]he union's practical purpose in
participating [ I will be largely uniform: it will seek to delay or
halt the closing."7 The Court thought that it was "unlikely...
that requiring bargaining over the decision itself, as well as its
effects, will augment th[e] flow of information or suggestions" to
management; such a requirement would therefore not "foster in a
neutral manner a system in which the conflict between [labor
and management] may be resolved."72
union, whether the reason is "lack of money or a mere desire to become richer." Id at 465.
' NLRB v First National Maintenance Corp., 627 F2d 596, 601-02 (1980).
66 Id at 601.
' First National Maintenance, 452 US at 678-79.
68 Id at 679.
6 Id at 678 ("iMlandatory bargaining is premised on the belief that collective discus-
sion backed by the parties' economic weapons will result in decisions that are better for
both management and labor."). Justices Brennan and Marshall argued in dissent that the
Court's balancing test did not foster such a neutral resolution because it took account only
of managements interest. Id at 689-90 (Brennan dissenting).
70 Id at 677.
71 Id at 681.
72 Id at 680-81.
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The Court distinguished its ruling in First National Mainte-
nance from Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v NLRB, in which it
had required management to bargain about its decision to sub-
contract work previously done by unionized employees."3 In that
case, "a desire to reduce labor costs.., was at the base of the
employer's decision to subcontract."74 The Fibreboard Court
found this desire "peculiarly suitable for resolution within the
collective bargaining framework,"' noting that the decision "did
not alter the [c]ompany's basic operation."76 Such bargaining,
the Fibreboard Court had concluded, "would not significantly
abridge [the employer's] freedom to manage the business."77
The First National Maintenance Court explicitly limited its
decision: "In this opinion we of course intimate no view as to
other types of management decisions, such as plant relocations,
sales, other kinds of subcontracting, automation, etc., which are
to be considered on their particular facts."' The Court neither
discussed nor even cited Truitt, although both opinions address
the NLRA's limits on management autonomy and seem to reach
divergent conclusions. Truitt requires an employer to disclose
financial information when asserting inability to pay, while First
National Maintenance excuses the employer from even having to
bargain over certain management decisions, let alone having to
disclose information."
The tension between First National Maintenance and Truitt
becomes quite evident when one considers that an inability to
pay arguably represents the most essential of management deci-
sions. Indeed, the First National Maintenance Court's holding
that management must be "free from the constraints of the bar-
gaining process to the extent essential for the running of a prof-
itable business"' bears a striking resemblance to the Fourth
73 379 US 203 (1964).
74 First National Maintenance, 452 US at 680, citing Fibreboard, 379 US at 213-14.
7' Fibreboard, 379 US at 214.
76 Id at 213.
' Id. This Comment does not discuss whether the Court's attempt to distinguish
Fibreboard is particularly persuasive. For present purposes, the lesson of the cases lies in
the logic that if labor costs are the reason behind the employer's decision, the employer
will more likely be required to bargain about the decision.
78 First National Maintenance, 452 US at 686 n 22 (emphasis added). See also id at
687 ("In order to illustrate the limits of our holding, we turn to the specific facts of this
case.").
79 Only two cases relevant to this discussion incorporate both opinions. See Olivetti
Office U.S.A., Inc. v NLRB, 926 F2d 181, 186, 188 (2d Cir 1991); Nielsen II, 977 F2d at
1169-70.
452 US at 678-79.
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Circuit's holding in Truitt that financial information concerned
matters within the "province of management"s 1 -a holding that
the Truitt Court implicitly rejected. By seemingly contradicting
Truitt, First National Maintenance further complicates the ques-
tion of how competitive disadvantage claims should be treated.
III. COMPETITIVE DISADVANTAGE CLAIMS IN THE CIRCUIT
COURTS
Until the Seventh Circuit's Nielsen 11 decision, which explic-
itly relied on First National Maintenance, courts based the duty
to disclose financial information on differing interpretations of
Truitt. One line of cases reads Truitt to require employers to
substantiate any competitive disadvantage claim. The other line
has taken the opposite view, holding that management need back
up only inability-to-pay claims. This Section describes both inter-
pretations and discusses their persuasiveness.
A. Western Wirebound: The Broad Disclosure Standard
In NLRB v Western Wirebound Box Co., the Ninth Circuit
applied Truitt beyond inability-to-pay claims by enforcing a
Board order requiring an employer to back up its competitive
disadvantage claim. 2 The Western Wirebound doctrine embodies
the principle that in order to ensure fair collective bargaining,
the union must be able to evaluate management's claims." As
one commentator has argued, "the nature of the employer's claim
is irrelevant; the important principle is that an employer must
prove what it claims."" The Western Wirebound court reasoned
that in both inability-to-pay and competitive disadvantage cases,
"the give-and-take of collective bargaining is hampered and ren-
81 224 F2d at 874.
82 356 F2d 88, 91 (9th Cir 1966).
8 Id at 90-91.
84 Note, 87 Mich L Rev at 2035 (cited in note 4). Several courts and commentators
have endorsed the Western Wirebound approach. Cases include New York Printing Press-
men & Offset Workers Union No. 51 v NLRB, 538 F2d 496 (2d Cir 1976); Sioux City
Stockyards, 901 F2d at 669-70; K-Mart Corp v NLRB, 626 F2d 704 (9th Cir 1980). For
additional favorable commentary, see John Gaal, The Disclosure of Financial Information:
Competitiveness and the Current Requirements of The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 38
Labor L J 562, 569-71 (1987); Florian Bartosic and Roger C. Hartley, The Employer's Duty
to Supply Information to the Union-A Study in the Interplay of Administrative and
Judicial Rationalization, 58 Cornell L Rev 23, 46 n 97 (1972).
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dered ineffectual when an employer mechanically repeats his
claim but makes no effort to produce substantiating data.""5
Proponents of Western Wirebound argue that Truitt's lan-
guage sweeps far more broadly than the substantiation of the in-
ability-to-pay claim at issue there. For example, the Truitt Court
reasoned that if an argument "is important enough to present in
the give and take of bargaining, it is important enough to require
some sort of proof of its accuracy" and noted that "[glood-faith
bargaining necessarily requires that claims made by either bar-
gainer should be honest claims." 6 Further, the Court stated
that "[t]he ability of an employer to increase wages without inju-
ry to his business is a commonly considered factor in wage nego-
tiations."87
This argument also implies that unverified claims of both
competitive disadvantage and inability to pay similarly under-
mine the bargaining process." Thus, although the Truitt Court
focused primarily on the employer's conduct, Western Wirebound
proponents argue that it was concerned not with such conduct in
the abstract, but rather with the effect such conduct had on the
union's ability to bargain. Under this instrumentalist interpre-
tation, the problem with dishonest claims is that they hamper
the bargaining process by preventing the union from fully partici-
pating." In short, Western Wirebound uses Truitt to fashion a
per se rule that enables the union to make headway in bargain-
ing, not one that simply punishes dishonest employers.
If the Truitt Court was primarily concerned with the effect of
unsubstantiated claims on the union's ability to bargain, it also
follows that the union should be able to trigger disclosure.
[T]he give-and-take of bargaining... [is] rendered less effec-
tive by [the employer's] withholding of correlated data from
the Union's scrutiny. If the Union cannot meaningfully eval-
uate the employer's proof, it cannot know whether the
company's claims are honest or accurate.9"
Therefore, the Western Wirebound doctrine requires that employ-
ers support their claims, regardless of whether an employer
8 Western Wirebound, 356 F2d at 91.
8 Truitt, 351 US at 152-53.
8 Id at 152.
Western Wirebound, 356 F2d at 91.
See Note, 87 Mich L Rev at 2050-51 (cited in note 4).
'0 General Electric Co. v NLRB, 466 F2d 1177, 1184 (6th Cir 1972).
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makes a particular claim in good faith. This is essentially a pre-
sumption that failing to back up claims amounts to bad faith.
B. Western Wirebound: Carrying Truitt Too Far
Proponents defend Western Wirebound's per se rule of bad
faith on several grounds. First, the rule avoids cumbersome case-
by-case inquiries that require the Board and the reviewing court
to sift through long records, possibly delaying bargaining for
years."' Second, even if such inquiries could be accomplished
expeditiously, they involve ascertaining the parties' states of
mind-a process that proponents assert inevitably devolves into a
search for objective criteria to evaluate the parties' conduct dur-
ing bargaining." Reliance on such criteria, they claim, creates
the "incongruous result of the NLRB and the courts regulating
the manner in which collective bargaining is conducted regard-
less of the actor's actual state of mind."93 Because the Western
Wirebound view focuses on the effect of unsubstantiated claims
on the bargaining process, an inquiry into good faith would be
unnecessary.
However, all of these arguments ignore the direct conflict
between the Western Wirebound doctrine and the reasoning of
Truitt itself. The Truitt Court specifically stated that it was not
even requiring substantiation of all inability-to-pay claims,94 yet
proponents of the Western Wirebound doctrine distort Truitt to
provide support for their per se rule requiring substantiation of
all competitive disadvantage claims.95 It is true that lower
courts and the Board have uniformly held that Truitt created a
per se rule, rather than a presumption, for inability-to-pay
claims,96 and that the Supreme Court has not overruled any of
these seemingly blatant misreadings of Truitt. But neither the
fact that many courts have misread Truitt nor the Court's acqui-
escence in this regard provides a convincing basis for extending
these misreadings of Truitt to competitive disadvantage claims.
One commentator has argued that Truitt may actually have
required a case-by-case analysis, but claims that finding bad faith
based on the failure to back up claims makes sense as a modern
91 See Note, 87 Mich L Rev at 2051 (cited in note 4).
9 Id at 2043-44.
' Id at 2044, citing Cox, 71 Harv L Rev at 1430 (cited in note 58).
'4 Truitt, 351 US at 153.
See, for example, Note, 87 Mich L Rev at 2030.
See note 58.
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rule.97 If the effect on the union is the same no matter what the
employer intends, so the argument runs, an inquiry into the
employer's state of mind would be pointless. 8 Whether the em-
ployer is honest or trying to stall negotiations makes no differ-
ence to the union. The effect on the union and the bargaining
process is the same regardless of the truth of the claims.99
Although this may be true, the argument assumes the bar-
gaining process as a whole would change for the better. The
Western Wirebound doctrine fails to acknowledge the risk that
unions will misuse financial information.0 0 Such a concern is
consistent with the First National Maintenance Court's protection
of management autonomy.
C. Harvstone/Nielsen: The Narrow Disclosure Standard
In a series of cases beginning in 1966, the Seventh Circuit
has interpreted Truitt as requiring that employers need back up
only their inability-to-pay claims.' Under this view, the
Harvstone/Nielsen doctrine, unless an employer claims inability
to pay, it is simply claiming that it does not want to pay, a claim
it need not verify.1"2
The Harvstone/Nielsen decisions provide three arguments for
reading Truitt narrowly. First, the Supreme Court in Truitt in-
tended only to prevent impermissible threats of bankruptcy, a
concern limited to inability-to-pay claims.0° Second, competitive
disadvantage claims are separately protected as expressions of
disagreement under § 8(d) of the NLRA. °4 Finally, even if com-
petitive disadvantage claims are threats, and even if they repre-
sent more than simply an unwillingness to reach agreement, they
' Note, 87 Mich L Rev at 2031-32, 2046-47.
98 Id at 2043-44.
9 Id at 2046.
"® See text accompanying notes 149-53.
101 See Nielsen II, 977 F2d at 1170-71; Nielsen I, 854 F2d at 1065-66; Harvstone, 785
F2d at 575; United Fire Proof Warehouse v NLRB, 356 F2d 494, 498 (7th Cir 1966).
Recently, the Board and several courts have adopted some variant of this position. See,
for example, Washington Materials Inc., 276 NLRB 839, 840 (1985), enf'd in relevant part,
803 F2d 1333 (4th Cir 1986); AMF Bowling Co. v NLRB, 977 F2d 141 (4th Cir 1992);
Facet Enterprises, Inc. v NLRB, 907 F2d 963, 980 (10th Cir 1990); Local 14534, 983 F2d
240, 244-45 (DC Cir 1993); United Paperworkers Int'l Union v NLRB, 981 F2d 861 (6th
Cir 1992).
' See United Fire Proof, 356 F2d at 498.
,o' Nielsen II, 977 F2d at 1170.
104 See United Fire Proof, 356 F2d at 498; 29 USC § 158(d) (The obligation to bargain
collectively in good faith "does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require
the making of a concession.").
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are protected as management "decisions" under First National
Maintenance.0 5
1. Truitt and impermissible threats.
The Nielsen II court distinguished competitive disadvantage
claims from the inability-to-pay claims at issue in Truitt based on
the meaning of the claims themselves. The court noted that if the
union cannot demand substantiation of inability-to-pay claims,
"the employer would have an unfair advantage in bargaining,
because it would be making an express or implied threat (of
bankruptcy) that the union could not evaluate."0 6 According to
the Seventh Circuit, the Truitt Court was concerned that if such
threats could occur,
labor negotiations would involve an even greater element of
bluff, guesswork, and sheer gambling than they inevitably
do, because the union would be put to the Hobson's choice of
acceding to a quite possibly exaggerated claim of poverty or
risking its members' jobs. The [Truitt] Court didn't think
that forcing the union to play Russian roulette was the epit-
ome of good faith bargaining.0 7
This interpretation of Truitt presumes that the major deci-
sion unions need to make is whether to strike or to accede to the
employer's demands." 8 To make this decision, the court rea-
soned that the union only needs prior assurance that the strike
will not be futile.' If the employer can afford higher wages
than it claims, however, it would also be more likely to survive a
strike and be able permanently to replace union workers." ° Un-
der this argument, an inability-to-pay claim is improper because
the union is forced to decide without complete information. The
threat thus improperly limits the union's ability to exercise its
right to strike."'
In contrast, competitive disadvantage claims create no such
problem. Once the employer states that it can pay, the union has
1" See Nielsen II, 977 F2d at 1170.
106 Id.
i Nielsen I, 854 F2d at 1065.
"' Nielsen II, 977 F2d at 1171.
109 Id.
110 Under the rule in NLRB v MacKay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 US 333, 345-46
(1938), an employer may permanently replace striking workers so long as it has not
committed an unfair labor practice.
. Nielsen II, 977 F2d at 1170; Nielsen I, 854 F2d at 1065.
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"all the information it need[s] to decide whether to knuckle under
to the company's demands or call a strike.""' So long as the
employer is not acting under the "pressure of financial necessity,"
the union knows that the employer "might bend if the union
[can] apply enough countervailing pressure on company profits by
striking.""3
2. Competitive disadvantage and the right to disagree.
The Seventh Circuit has explained in several cases that if an
employer does not claim inability to pay, it is actually claiming
an ability to pay. According to the Harvstone court, "[t]he rele-
vant test [under Truitt] ... is to ascertain whether the employer
said it 'would not' as opposed to 'could not' pay the employees'
proposed demands.""' Because management can pay the wages
requested, a competitive disadvantage claim must mean that it
simply does not want to pay them.
115
According to the HarvstonelNielsen doctrine, employers who
make competitive disadvantage claims without substantiation are
simply being stubborn."6 Since § 8(d) of the NLRA protects the
right of the parties to disagree, making such a claim without
substantiation is not an unfair labor practice."' Moreover, as
the court stated in Nielsen I, requiring the employer to back up "a
"want" is pointless: "A need is objective; it can be substantiated.
But how do you substantiate a want? If a company says it wants
to make higher profits by reducing its labor costs, what data
would falsify its statement?""8
3. Competitive disadvantage claims as management
"decisions."
Even if competitive disadvantage claims represent more than
disagreement, and even if they are in fact threats similar to in-
ability-to-pay claims, a broad interpretation of First National
Maintenance would still excuse management from any obligation
12 Nielsen II, 977 F2d at 1171.
'1 Id.
.1. Harvstone, 785 F2d at 575-76, citing United Fire Proof, 356 F2d at 498.
15 Harvstone, 785 F2d at 576. "[An] employer operating at a competitive disadvantage
[may be] financially able, although perhaps unwilling, to pay increased wages." Id at 577.
16 Nielsen II, 977 F2d at 1171; United Fire Proof, 356 F2d at 498.
117 Id.
1 Nielsen I, 854 F2d at 1065.
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to back up such claims.11 9 The distinction between mandatory
and permissive bargaining subjects entitles the employer to make
certain statements, including (it is argued) competitive disadvan-
tage claims, with impunity. 20 Because a competitive disadvan-
tage claim concerns a decision about the future of the enterprise,
which is generally not a mandatory subject of bargaining, the
fact that the employer ties its claim to a negotiating position on
wages will not trigger a duty to back up the claim.'2 '
In Nielsen II, the court explained, "[t]he company claimed
that to stem the hemorrhage of its business it had to cut the
compensation of its hourly workers. Well, was that true?" 22 The
court left this question unanswered, implying that the union had
neither a need for nor a right to substantiation. That is, even if
the claim were false, the employer would have no duty to back it
up. Rather, the union's "right" to substantiation extended only so
far as it could force disclosure by use of its power to strike.2
To receive First National Maintenance's protection of man-
agement autonomy, competitive disadvantage claims must be
decisions about which management need not bargain. When an
employer claims that it can afford to pay the wages demanded,
the argument goes, it is not "in any financial trouble" and is not
threatening bankruptcy; it is merely announcing a decision about
the scale of operations.24 Thus, an employer making a competi-
tive disadvantage claim could only bargain about "whether to
shrink its operations."25
In Nielsen II, the court rejected the notion that the union
should have a say in the decision whether to shrink operations,
explaining that "[clodetermination is not the theory of the
[NLRA]. The company decides its scale of operations. The union
has no say .... " Under this rationale, the only question the
119 See Nielsen II, 977 F2d at 1170-71.
12 See text accompanying notes 67-72.
.2 See Nielsen 11, 977 F2d at 1170-71. .See also text accompanying notes 73-79.
12 Nielsen 11, 977 F2d at 1171.
12 Judge Posner, author of the Nielsen decisions, agrees that the NLRA prohibits par-
ties from making false claims. However, not every possibility of a false claim requires the
same safeguards. The risk that an inability-to-pay claim is false is substantial enough to
impose a duty on the employer to disclose. The risk that a competitive disadvantage claim
is false is much lower, and an employer therefore should not be required to substantiate.
Conversation with Judge Richard A. Posner (memo on file with U Chi L Rev).
124 Nielsen II, 977 F2d at 1170. This argument relies on the premise that "financial
trouble" does not include situations in which an employer "continue[s] losing business" but
is still "profitable at one percent of current output." See id.
122 Id.
12 Id at 1170-71, citing First National Maintenance, 452 US at 676.
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union has the right to have answered is whether the employer
can in fact afford to pay the wage the union has requested. 7
Once management acknowledges that it can afford the wage,2
the union has all the information it needs (or is entitled to). 29
D. Harvstone/Nielsen: Applying False Analogies
None of the rationales supporting the Harvstone/Nielsen
doctrine holds up under close examination. Further, while this
Comment agrees that First National Maintenance should inform
the proper disclosure standard for competitive disadvantage
claims, the Seventh Circuit's derivation of the Harvstone/Nielsen
doctrine misapplies the rule from that case.
1. Threats, needs, and wants.
According to the Seventh Circuit, Truitt protects unions
against impermissible "threats," and competitive disadvantage
claims are not threatening. Thus, a union facing such a claim has
all the information it needs in order to know whether to strike.
Because it knows the employer can, in some sense, afford to pay
the requested wage, a strike might not be futile. 3 '
The union does not, however, have all the information it
needs to make an informed decision; it has only the information
it is apparently entitled to receive. For example, if an employer
claims that it must cut wages in order to "stem the hemorrhage
of its business,"'' the union may have no idea whether the
statement is true or false. Claims that link an employer's de-
mands to the financial health of the company threaten the union
precisely because they raise the risk there will be no company at
all if the union does not accede to the employer's demands. Fur-
ther, an employer making the "hemorrhage" claim cannot in any
"2 Id at 1171.
128 It is unclear whether the employer must explicitly acknowledge its ability to pay.
In Nielsen II, the court noted that "[ilf [an employer] disclaims poverty, it moots any re-
quest for information that would be relevant only if poverty were being claimed." 977 F2d
at 1171 (emphasis added). In Harvstone, however, the court noted that the employers
"never implied that they were financially unable, as opposed to unwilling, to meet the
Union's demands." 785 F2d at 576. A competitive disadvantage claim might therefore
contain an implicit disclaimer of poverty.
' Nielsen II, 977 F2d at 1171. To illustrate how the company moots a demand for in-
formation by conceding that it can pay the requested wages, the court analogized the un-
ion to a civil litigant in discovery who receives a stipulation instead of documents. Id.
w See text accompanying notes 106-113.
... Nielsen II, 977 F2d at 1170.
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meaningful way be simultaneously claiming it is not "in any
financial trouble.""2 Both statements cannot be true. 3' If the
employer can make the union believe it is in financial trouble, its
competitive disadvantage claim would be only slightly less
threatening than an inability-to-pay claim.
Additionally, courts applying the HarvstonelNielsen doctrine
assert that competitive disadvantage claims are simply manifes-
tations of an employer's disagreement with the union's position.
Yet competitive disadvantage claims are typically stated as needs
rather than wants. For example, a court found a competitive
disadvantage claim where the employer said that "concessions
were needed in order to 'be competitive' and 'survive in today's
market."3 4
Just as with inability-to-pay claims, when an employer
claims competitive disadvantage it asserts that it "cannot" pay
the requested wage without dire consequences. The urgency of
the need falls off when an employer claims that while it can pay
now, it will lose business and lay off workers. This does not, how-
ever, transform a need into a want. In contrast, when an employ-
er says that it would like to make more money or that it wants to
be more competitive, it does not link its position to a prediction
about the future of the enterprise. While such claims may repre-
sent serious bargaining positions, they are more likely to be in-
terpreted as "puffing" than as a threat.
There is a crucial difference between an employer's assertion
that the union's demands are unreasonable and the assertion
that accepting the demands would be economically irrational.
When an employer states that it needs a concession in order to
survive, either immediately or in the long-term, it intends its
statement to be acted upon, and such statements should be made
in good faith.
Moreover, contrary to the Seventh Circuit's implication,
13
the NLRA may forbid persistent claims by management that it
does not want to pay. While the NLRA does not require the par-
ties to agree, it nonetheless prohibits the parties from coming to
the table with a predisposition against reaching agreement.3 '
132 Id.
" The Nielsen II court did not actually deny this; it simply implied that whether the
"hemorrhage" claim is true or not is irrelevant. Id at 1171.
" Local 14534, 983 F2d at 244. See also Western Wirebound, 356 F2d at 89 ("[A] cut
was necessary because of price cutting indulged in by competition.").
13 See Nielsen II, 977 F2d at 1171.
13 See 29 USC § 158(d). See also text accompanying notes 19-22. An employer cannot
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To the extent management's unsupported claim manifests such
an intent, it is irrelevant whether the claim concerns a manda-
tory or non-mandatory subject.'37 Repeated, but unsubstanti-
ated, competitive disadvantage claims could be strong evidence of
such predisposition.
2. Misinterpreting the scope of First National Maintenance.
The Seventh Circuit's application of First National Mainte-
nance to competitive disadvantage claims improperly disregards
that case's balancing test, assumes that such claims are actually
"management decisions," and contradicts Truitt.
a) Neglecting the First National Maintenance balancing
test. The Harvstone/Nielsen doctrine incorporates a misinterpre-
tation of First National Maintenance. The Seventh Circuit as-
sumes that all decisions about the scale of operations lie outside
the realm of mandatory subjects of bargaining."' Yet in deter-
mining whether specific management decisions are mandatory or
permissive bargaining subjects, First National Maintenance re-
quires the Board and the reviewing court to determine whether
the "benefit, for labor-management relations and the collective-
bargaining process, outweighs the burden placed on the conduct
of the business.""9 When it decided that partial closings were
not mandatory subjects of bargaining, the First National Mainte-
nance Court noted that "labor costs may not be a crucial circum-
stance in a particular economically based partial termina-
tion."' 4 At the same time, it distinguished Fibreboard, which
held the decision to subcontract work to be a mandatory sub-
ject,' noting that "a desire to reduce labor costs" was especial-
mechanically repeat claims or wants (even if true), if this is merely "surface" bargaining.
See NLRB v Reed & Prince Manufacturing Co., 205 F2d 131, 135 (1st Cir 1953).
" Employers need not bargain about non-mandatory subjects. However, an employer
that consistently responded to union wage proposals by stating, "I don't want to pay that,"
without ever offering an alternative or stating a reason could be held to have failed to
bargain in good faith.
Compare First National Maintenance, 452 US at 686 & n 22 (weighing the harms
and benefits caused by giving the union a voice in particular management decisions), with
Nielsen II, 977 F2d at 1170-71 (arguing that the union categorically has no say in the
scale of the employer's operations).
1 First National Maintenance, 452 US at 679.
14 Id at 685.
.. Fibreboard, 379 US at 213.
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ly "suitable for resolution within the collective bargaining
framework." 42
In a recent plant relocation case that raises issues under
both First National Maintenance and Truitt, the Second Circuit
held that an employer must not only bargain about its decision to
transfer business from Connecticut to Georgia, Texas, and Mexi-
co, but must also provide the union with information to back up
its claim that it needed to make the transfer because of labor
costs. Applying the First National Maintenance balancing
test, the Second Circuit first noted that under Fibreboard, an
employer must bargain about an economically motivated action
that results in no change in basic business operations.' Find-
ing that the employer's decision was "motivated by a desire to
reduce labor costs," and that such decisions are "particularly
suited to resolution through the collective bargaining process,"
the court concluded that "the Company's course of conduct would
not have been unduly hampered by bargaining." 4
5
When an employer has decided to scale back rather than
close part of its operations, and where labor costs dominate the
resolution of this issue, the First National Maintenance benefit-
burden test suggests that such management decisions are usually
not insulated from bargaining. If wages are the basis for the
company's decision to lay off workers and scale back operations,
then, the Harvstone/Nielsen doctrine notwithstanding, Fibreboard
and First National Maintenance seem to command that the union
does indeed have a say in the decision.
b) Claims are not decisions. Assuming First National
Maintenance applies to decisions about the scale of operations as
well as to partial closings, it applies only to decisions. To invoke
First National Maintenance, management should first have to
claim it has made or is about to make a decision about which it
need not bargain. Yet management cannot unilaterally decide to
14 First National Maintenance, 452 US at 680, quoting Fibreboard, 379 US at 214.
143 Olivetti Office U.S.A., Inc. v NLRB, 926 F2d 181, 188 (2d Cir 1991).
14 Id at 186, citing Fibreboard, 379 US at 213.
' Olivetti, 926 F2d at 186 (internal quotations omitted). The Second Circuit has long
construed Truitt as consistent with the Western Wirebound doctrine. See New York Print-
ing Pressmen and Offset Workers Union No 51 v NLRB, 538 F2d 496, 500 (2d Cir 1976).
Nonetheless, the employer in Olivetti asserted that it would not provide the information
for fear of a breach of confidentiality. 926 F2d at 184, 188. The court held such
"conclusory assertions" insufficient to defeat the obligation to substantiate its claim. Id at
188-89.
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reduce wages without first bargaining to an impasse, 146 even if
it might be able to unilaterally close 50 percent of its business
and lay off half of its workers. At most, competitive disadvantage
claims represent predictions about future business conditions,
given certain assumptions about wages and other factors. Thus,
an employer that makes a competitive disadvantage claim when
it has not yet made any decision cannot appropriately claim the
protection of First National Maintenance.
c) Implicitly overruling Truitt. Finally, if a competitive
disadvantage claim in fact represents a management decision, an
inability-to-pay claim presents an even stronger case for protec-
tion from substantiation because it implicates the "decision
whether to be in business at all."'47 In Nielsen II, the court rea-
soned that competitive disadvantage claims are about a
company's scale of operations, " 8 but the same is true of in-
ability-to-pay claims. In each case the employer links its financial
condition to the wages it pays.
If First National Maintenance holds that management need
never substantiate claims that link a potential decision to scale
back operations with the level of wages, then inability-to-pay (as
well as competitive disadvantage) claims must be insulated as
well, a conclusion that would contradict Truitt. Nothing in First
National Maintenance suggests that the Court intended to over-
rule Truitt, and no subsequent decision has so construed First
National Maintenance.
IV. CONTROLLED DISCLOSURE: REDEfiNING THE DUTY TO
SUBSTANTIATE
Both precedent and policy considerations suggest that com-
petitive disadvantage claims should be evaluated on a case-by-
case basis, rather than through the unsatisfactory Western
Wirebound and Harvstone/Nielsen approaches. This Comment
proposes an intermediate disclosure standard: Management
should have to back up competitive disadvantage claims if the
Board finds substantial evidence that management has either
lied during bargaining or come to the table unwilling to agree.
However, the union may only use the information it gains to
14 See 29 USC § 158(d).
14 First National Maintenance, 452 US at 677.
48 See 977 F2d at 1170.
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substantiate management's claim. The Board should require
management to release the information when management vio-
lates widely-held notions of good faith, but control the union's use
of the information once disclosed.
A. Determining Management's Good Faith
1. Relevance.
Before inquiring into good faith in a particular context, the
Board should determine whether the claim was relevant to bar-
gaining. A relevant claim would be one on which the parties
would reasonably rely during negotiations. Irrelevant claims in-
duce no reliance, and thus need not be supported. In determining
whether a claim was relevant, the Board must inquire into how
management intended the claim to be taken, and how the union
might rationally have interpreted it. The Board should determine
whether management intended the union to act on its claim, and
whether a reasonable union would have based its actions on the
accuracy of the claim.
2. Predisposition and honesty.
Once the Board finds that the claim is relevant, it should
determine whether the claim was made in good faith.49 To de-
termine if the employer came to the negotiations with a predispo-
sition not to agree, the Board should consider whether the claim
was repeated mechanically, without any offer of substantiating
evidence. To determine if the employer's refusal to substantiate
the claim suggests untruth, the Board should consider: (1) wheth-
er the employer has an economic interest in supporting the claim;
(2) whether substantiation of the claim might force bargaining
about .non-mandatory subjects such as decisions about the future
of the business; and (3) whether the information might be used to
embarrass the employer or to delay negotiations.
These "truthfulness questions" draw their power from the
economic forces acting on the employer. First, since an employer
wants to pay wages as low as possible, it has an incentive to seek
concessions from the union. The union likewise has an incentive
to push for wages as high as possible. An employer might honest-
ly believe, for example, that current wages are too high or that
the union's requested increase would be too large. Such conces-
149 See text accompanying notes 19-22.
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sions are more likely if the employer supports its claim. Thus, an
employer's failure to back up a claim when substantiation would
be in its best economic interest provides probative, but not dis-
positive, evidence of untruthfulness.
Second, an employer might legitimately refuse to back up an
accurate claim when it reasonably fears that the union would
misuse the information. For example, in Sign and Pictorial Un-
ion Local 1175 v NLRB, the union alleged that strike replace-
ments were receiving higher wages than strikers and requested
wage information, which would have included the names of re-
placements. 5 ° Fearing that the replacements would be ha-
rassed, the employer refused to provide the information, and the
court upheld the Board's decision.' 5 ' On the other hand, if the
union is unlikely to misuse the information, there is less reason
to withhold it-and therefore some reason to suspect the veracity
of the claim.
If the Board determines that the claim is untrue or a possi-
ble stalling tactic, it may require substantiation. In making its
determination, the Board should review an employer's financial
information in camera before requiring disclosure. This is not a
burdensome requirement, and it will facilitate the resolution of
the parties' dispute through informal discussions. Indeed, the
vast majority of labor disputes are settled by means of informal
discussions among representatives of the Board, the employer,
and the union."2
Under the controlled disclosure approach, then, financial
information lies in the exclusive province of management-unless
management uses the information improperly. Thus, if manage-
ment uses the information as leverage for a false claim, the
Board may order disclosure. This approach is consistent with the
general rule that the scope of the duty to disclose financial infor-
mation is limited to verifying claims.'
0 419 F2d 726, 737-38 (DC Cir 1969).
... Id at 738.
152 National Labor Relations Board, Fifty-Fifth Annual Report for the Fiscal Year
Ended September 30, 1990 6-7 (US GPO, 1992). In fiscal year 1990, approximately 86
percent of all meritorious cases were settled through formal or informal agreements at the
regional level, and another 7 percent were disposed by compliance with an administrative
law judge's decision. The final 7 percent were contested before the Board.
10 See text accompanying notes 39-40.
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B. Reconciling Truitt and First National Maintenance
The controlled disclosure approach reconciles the potential
conflict between First National Maintenance and Truitt. Truitt
held that an employer's obligation to disclose financial informa-
tion must turn on the "particular facts" of each case.' This
language suggests that the Court rejected both the broad and the
narrow per se rules for financial information disclosures, even if
it did not spell out clearly how the Board should determine good
faith in such cases.
The controlled disclosure approach thus reads Truitt to re-
quire that claims beyond inability-to-pay be supported. However,
by requiring a case-by-case determination of good faith, the Court
did not impose on employers the duty to back up every claim.
Why did the Court limit the employer's duty to claims made in
bad faith, given that it could have predicted that the effect of an
unsupported claim on the union would likely be the same regard-
less of whether the claim was true or not? It is possible that the
Truitt Court feared that management might abuse its right to
withhold information and the union might abuse the information
once it was disclosed.
Under this reading, Truitt is a compromise. Rather than
endorsing either a broad or narrow rule, Truitt suggests an ex-
pectation that conditions will vary, sometimes allowing employ-
ers to make claims without substantiation, other times requiring
substantiation in order to keep bargaining open. The Court fo-
cused on the bargaining process in general, rather than simply
on the effect of a particular rule on the union's ability to make
progress in negotiations. Further, the general requirement of
good faith does not allow dishonest claims in the bargaining
process. This interpretation implies that the Court wanted the
Board to make the determination of whether a claim need be
substantiated, rather than allowing the union to force-or the
employer to block-disclosure.'55
The controlled disclosure approach also reconciles First Na-
tional Maintenance with Truitt. The First National Maintenance
Court reasoned that "[mianagement must be free from the con-
straints of the bargaining process to the extent essential for the
351 US at 153:
1 The Western Wirebound standard holds that the union should be able to force
disclosure. See text accompanying note 90. Under the Harmstone/Nielsen doctrine, the
veracity of competitive disadvantage claims is irrelevant, and management can prevent
disclosure in such cases. See text accompanying notes 122-23.
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running of a profitable business."'56 The risk that the union will
misuse information extends beyond simple harassment and de-
lay. The union might second-guess the employer's bargaining
position or press for even higher wages after receiving substan-
tiating financial data.'57 Forcing an inquiry into the employer's
good faith before requiring disclosure places the Board under an
affirmative obligation to assess the risk of union second-guessing
and harassment. Even where an employer's claim was made in
bad faith, the Board would be required to tailor its disclosure
order to account for the risk of union misuse.' 58
By requiring case-by-base inquiries, the controlled disclosure
approach protects employers and unions from each other's misuse
of financial information. If an employer makes a claim in bad
faith, it must substantiate. However, the union can only use the
information to verify the claim-it may not, for example, base a
strike decision on the information. If the union decided to receive
the substantiating information, it could still strike later, but
would have to prove it did not base the strike on the disclosed
information. It is unlikely the union would risk this burden.
Consider a case where an employer claims that it needs a
wage concession of $1.75 an hour in order to remain competitive
and the union asks for substantiating information. The employer
voluntarily discloses a financial analysis substantiating its posi-
tion, which shows a range of possible concession from $1.00 to
$2.50. With the threat of a strike, the union might exploit the
analysis by insisting on a concession of $1.25. Since the union is
only entitled to the information for the purposes of substanti-
ating the employer's claim, and not to enable it to bargain more
effectively, this use would be prohibited. In determining whether
the union had misused the information, the Board would look at
statements union representatives made to rank-and-file workers.
This notion is controversial. This Comment argues that some
restraint on the union's use of the information is necessary to
ensure consistency with First National Maintenance. However,
18 First National Maintenance, 452 US at 678-79.
157 The information a union requests may itself be evidence of an intent to harass the
employer or otherwise interfere with the bargaining process. For example, in Nielsen II
the court noted that the union asked for information on management perqui-
sites-something outside the scope of mandatory bargaining. 977 F2d at 1169.
" The union's use of the information beyond simply substantiating management's
claim might even be seen as a punishment of the employer. The Board has no authority to
penalize an employer; it can only order remedies that will make the workers whole. See
NLRB v Strong, 393 US 357, 359 (1969).
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the Court has not addressed whether it would be an unfair labor
practice for the union to use financial information to obtain a
more favorable bargaining position on a mandatory subject. In
NLRB v Jacobs Manufacturing Co., a case cited in Truitt, the
Second Circuit noted that the union would not be entitled to
information that would allow it to second-guess management's
decisions." 9 This Comment argues that the Jacobs court's rea-
soning should be extended to cover the union's use of financial infor-
mation after disclosure.
160
The controlled disclosure rule thus balances the risks of both
union and management abuse. Management should be subject to
a rule that does not allow it to harass or delay, and the union
should face a rule that will limit the permissible uses it can
make of the information it receives. In this way, both parties
internalize the cost of their own abuses-and thus face incentives
to minimize such behavior.
The controlled disclosure approach may be more complicated
to administer, because it requires an inquiry into whether the
claim was honest or part of a predisposition not to reach agree-
ment. According to one commentator, the Board and the courts
would be spared this "onerous judicial task" if the Western
Wirebound standard were adopted.'16 This claim is true, howev-
er, only if one assumes compliance with the Western Wirebound
rule. In fact, a recalcitrant employer would be able to delay dis-
closure with minimal penalty to itself even under a per se rule of
substantiation.'62 Additionally, while the Board's inquiry under
either of the per se rules might be shorter, it must seek en-
forcement in the courts of appeal,6 3 and its decision is still sub-
ject to review.16 Since these latter concerns clearly exist under
the controlled disclosure rule as well, the advantage of applying
either of the per se rules seems minimal.
'0 196 F2d 680, 684 (2d Cir 1952) (holding the Board could not require an employer
to produce proof that its "business decision" was right).
'60 In Truitt, the Court found that the Board's disclosure order was not burdensome,
and so declined to rule on the scope of Board orders generally. 351 US at 1510.
161 Note, 87 Mich L Rev at 2051 (cited in note 4).
1 Remedies under the NLRA have historically been insufficient to deter most em-
ployers who want to fight their unions. Textile Workers Union v Darlington Manufacturing
Co., 380 US 263 (1965), is a particularly notorious example. By the time all appeals had
been exhausted and final judgment was entered, one-third of the employees were dead.
See Summers, et al, Labor Law at 443-44 (cited in note 23).
16 See 29 USC § 160(e).
Any aggrieved party may file a petition for review of an order by the Board in the
courts of appeal. See 29 USC § 160(0.
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Moreover, because this Comment's approach requires the
Board to balance the possible risks of abuse in determining the
scope of disclosure required, it may actually appear more fair to
the parties from the outset than either per se rule and thus may
encourage voluntary compliance. A rule that prohibits employers
from lying or stalling and unions from harassing should be con-
sidered fair by both sides. An employer will be less likely to make
a claim in bad faith once it knows that the Board will eventually
find out the truth. Similarly, a union that knows that the Board
will limit the substance and use of disclosures will make more
reasonable requests.
If the parties agree on the level of disclosure beforehand, or
if the dispute is settled informally, the Board can avoid cumber-
some inquiries into good faith. The Western Wirebound approach,
however, may belittle management's concerns and make employ-
ers more likely to obfuscate. At the same time, the Harvstonel
Nielsen doctrine, by depriving unions of needed information, may
lead workers to strike out of spite. While neither party may con-
sider the Board a neutral forum, when the Board applies a rule
both parties consider fair, the parties may feel less need to press
claims in the first place. Even when they do, however, the polar-
izing effects and attendant risks of abuse under either per se rule
justify the additional inconvenience that the controlled disclosure
rule might cause.
CONCLUSION
Both employers and unions may misuse financial informa-
tion. Requiring substantiation of all competitive disadvantage
claims would give the union the power to bargain not only about
wages, but also about basic management decisions. At the same
time, never requiring substantiation would let management force
the union to make choices based on false or misleading claims.
Requiring a case-by-case finding that management's claim was
made in bad faith before requiring the disclosure of substantiat-
ing information, and controlling the use of that information by
the union, would minimize the risks of abuse by either par-
ty-thus preserving management autonomy while promoting
collective bargaining.
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